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Introduction
As humanitarian assistance becomes a more publicized and prominent part of American military capabilities, the missteps and miscues of senior leadership have become magnified by the press and the public. While engaged in two highly criticized wars in the Middle East, the United States must work even harder to eliminate any confusion as to our intentions during disaster relief efforts. This fact was reemphasized as the United States was the subject of great scrutiny during humanitarian assistance operations in Haiti following the 7.7 magnitude earthquake that devastated the country in January.
In conflicts around the world and throughout time, lessons have been learned and relearned regarding the transformation of political objectives into strategic objectives and then subsequently into operational objectives. For the United States, foreign humanitarian assistance operations support the political objective to promote effective democracies 1 through international cooperation and recognition. Strategically, "the goal of humanitarian assistance operations is to save lives, alleviate human suffering, and minimize the economic costs of conflicts, disasters, and displacement." 2 Synchronizing these objectives with the operational objective is critical to the success of the mission. In fact, some of the most notable battles and wars provide textbook examples of the process, although in some cases, they are examples of how the process failed. Just as historic wartime examples are studied to prepare for future conflicts, it is equally important to evaluate other-than-war missions to ensure the same political/strategic/operational mismatch that plagued nations in the past does and other, non-governmental, agencies went virtually unreported by the media. And although many of the success stories could not have been possible without the presence of the U.S. military, the good deeds were overshadowed by the misguided press reports. An aggressive media campaign was needed to subvert the negative publicity and highlight the positive work that was being accomplished in Haiti.
Even with its significant assistance capabilities, the United States must remain mindful of the history with these nations when involved in humanitarian relief efforts.
Regardless of any specific requests made by the host nation, the U.S. In another example of the identity crisis that existed among international and U.S.
government agencies operating in Haiti, the organizational diagram in Figure 1 The confusion over the lead agency was evident in press conferences conducted throughout the operation but especially in the initial stages of response. The first briefing on the situation in Haiti, held on January 13 th , was chaired by the Department of State and In addition, the military appeared to participate in many more press conferences and news specials than USAID representatives. USSOUTHCOM hosted several press conferences at their headquarters in which USAID representatives were present in the background but were never introduced nor did they speak. Lieutenant General P. K. "Ken" 
Security Responsibilities and Challenges
The security situation in Haiti proved to be another area of difficulty. Although recent humanitarian assistance operations in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and the tsunami in Indonesia showcased the need for a robust security force in post-disaster relief efforts, the American military was not immediately requested to perform this function.
Rather, this duty was fulfilled by MINUSTAH which was formed when nation-wide armed conflict forced Haitian President Bertrand Aristide into exile in 2004. 12 The United Nations tasked MINUSTAH to ensure a safe and stable environment, promote the legitimacy of the Haitian government, and support the human rights of Haitian citizens 13 , but the catastrophic events left a gap in the security throughout the country. Subsequently, DoD's shortsightedness exposed the United States to additional scrutiny.
Upon first notification of the tragedy in Haiti, USSOUTHCOM generated staff estimates for DoD involvement which included a security force element for the humanitarian response in the country. 14 But after the official request for forces was received the requirement disappeared, presumably because of MINUSTAH's presence and established relationship with the Government of Haiti prior to and during the earthquake. In a press briefing given on January 14th, General Fraser reemphasized the security responsibilities stating, "The security situation in the city and the country remains calm. The United Nations' mission, MINUSTAH, has been providing that security for a number of years.
They continue to provide that security, and the situation remains calm." 15 Neither SOUTHCOM nor JTF-H realized the impending need for additional security forces.
As a consequence of the magnitude of this catastrophic event and initially unbeknownst to the joint task force, MINUSTAH's effectiveness was severely degraded by personnel casualties, family tragedies, and environmental conditions. 16 JTF-H failed to recognize the problem because of initial reports and field assessments that characterized the region as stable. The sense of calm, however, was short-lived and probably a direct result of the shock felt by the population. When the shock wore off a sudden an unforeseen shift in the temperament of some of the local population occurred, and looting and violence erupted.
The humanitarian assistance organizations, and in large part, DoD, was unprepared for this rapid change. As the situation escalated and relief efforts were impacted, JTF-H immediately began supplementing MINUSTAH security forces and requested more troops be sent to the country. 17 The additional forces were needed to protect the individuals that were providing aid to the population, but the numbers were perceived as a much larger effort for a much larger mission. In response to the surge of American forces, one French official in charge of humanitarian aid rebuked, "This is about helping Haiti, not occupying Haiti."
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In retrospect, it is logical that the unrest among the population was inevitable. The failure of the task force to critically analyze and plan for this eventuality caused them to miss the opportunity to distribute the needed manpower requirements to other contributing foreign military forces and shape the perceptions of the media and the international community.
Regardless of MINUSTAH's ongoing presence in the country, the U.S. was still blamed for an insufficient security response in the initial phase and then scrutinized for an overzealous response in the second phase.
Perception is Reality
An important part of humanitarian assistance operations is managing the expectations of the general populace. The providers reassure the populace when they share timelines and information on relief efforts, and the providers, in turn, receive respect and gratitude from the recipients. In this case, however, it was just as important for DoD to manage the expectations of the international community and the media to help them understand capabilities and limitations of military response. employed them to monitor the security in the region. In order to prepare the distribution points Predator UAVs alerted regional security teams of potential problems so that an appropriate security force could be sent to maintain order and discipline and allow for the safe and efficient distribution of humanitarian aid. 21 The In fact, almost all photographs showed American troops, excluding those involved in medical assistance, carrying small arms weapons, so it is also likely that Haitian citizens had the same image of American "assistance".
Troop strength also misguided the perceptions of the global community. At its highest point, nearly 22,000 soldiers and sailors were dedicated to Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, some of which had been diverted from their deployments to the Middle East to assist in the stabilization of the country and the distribution of humanitarian aid. 23 But instead of this being publicized as a show of solidarity and compassion for the tragedy that befell Haiti, the international community twisted the United States' assistance into an "occupation" of the troubled country. The rapid influx of soldiers and sailors occurred approximately one week after the tragedy due to the changes in the security situation which further emphasizes the point that a more effective communications plan would have prepared the global community for the additional troops.
Photo 1. U.S. soldiers assist with aid distribution in Port-au-Prince.
Analysis
Given the fact that the U.S. military continues to be involved in two different wars half-way around the world, some argue that the importance of dispelling ill-informed or misguided public perceptions is a trivial or inconsequential battle. Unfortunately, in the rapid and evolving world of global media, now, more than ever, perception is reality. Blind ignorance to the potential impact of journalism is not an effective defense. In today's world more of the population relies on media headlines and photographs to get their news and less on the substantive information that allows for critical thinking. The U.S. military must take a more proactive approach to educating the public about the positive influence it makes throughout the world in order to achieve the nation's political objectives. Humanitarian assistance, by its nature, should be a relatively benign environment for military criticism.
The tragic circumstances and devastation that inflicted innocent, unknowing people has been the center of attention in the past, but DoD found itself fighting a new enemy in Haitipublic perception. While the United States should not be looking for glory because of the contribution it makes in helping neighbors, it should be able to expect a deviation from the harsh scrutiny it receives on the battlefield.
The Haiti earthquake is a profound example of the dynamic nature of politics and exemplifies the importance of critical analysis. No operation should be entered into without a close evaluation of the potential pitfalls and a plan to mitigate those identified. Although more difficult in the unpredictable environment of disaster relief, a thorough review of the critical vulnerabilities will lessen the risk to the operation, improve the likelihood of mission accomplishment, and, ultimately, achieve the political objective. Governmental agencies must be fully aware of the images they portray to the international community and focus their attention on eliminating misperceptions. If the United States is ineffective at sending a message of solidarity and cooperation, our political involvement in humanitarian assistance operations is futile.
Recommendations
It is well within the capability of the U.S. government to prevent similar scrutiny and criticism in future humanitarian assistance operations. Time must be invested in determining the lessons learned from Haiti and developing courses of actions that can be applied to disaster relief efforts and possibly other military operations.
The first and most important lesson to be learned is the value of a well-understood and well-coordinated command and control structure. In this case, the command structure was there but it lacked the proper coordination that facilitates unity of effort. USAID and by extension the USAID's cognizant bureau, OFDA, remains the logical choice as the lead agency in response to humanitarian assistance relief efforts due to their presence in the region both before and after these types of catastrophic events. They have developed a rapport with the agencies in country and are better positioned to maintain a consistent message regarding U.S. response. Furthermore, due to the nature of the work that DoD is expected to provide when a request for forces is made, the presence of the U.S. military will likely be for a much shorter period of time than international and non-governmental organizations such as OFDA.
Continuity is a key factor in gaining the trust of local government, and it will eliminate, or at least reduce, the propensity for the media to confuse the military's purpose or position of authority.
As the lead organization, USAID must also be readily identifiable as the primary coordinator during these crisis events. One way for USAID to ensure they maintain recognition as the lead organization is to be provided with a This simple change would significantly improve command and control during humanitarian assistance operations.
Another recommendation that would benefit from the assignment of a permanent military liaison is the effort to stabilize the region after a catastrophe occurs. Security is obviously a top priority in any disaster response, but it must be planned and executed
properly. Identifying the need and then utilizing the proper assets and quantities to fulfill that need are essential, but those are not the only elements. Close coordination with the host nation, as well as any other standing forces, must occur in the initial stages. Then the U.S.
must clearly state that they are a supplementary force and will assist in stabilizing the region.
Again, USAID/OFDA should be the facilitators of this effort, but DoD will need to coordinate the specifics in order for this to be effective.
Lastly, political objectives must have a clear strategic communications plan that the military can develop into an equally clear and executable information operations plan.
Although the military appears to be learning this lesson in conflicts around the world, they have yet to grasp its significance in the broader range of military operations. This process requires as much effort, if not more, to promote the policies of the United States and dissuade misperceptions by international partners and the global media. The plan should evaluate the need for every service member to be armed taking into consideration the security situation in the region but giving perception an equally important vote. In most cases a compromise would likely benefit both arguments. In addition, use of highly technical equipment may be counterproductive; a critical cost/benefit analysis should achieve the correct balance of efficiency and cooperation without jeopardizing the objective.
Conclusion
In a perfect world, the United States would not have to make a concerted effort to manage the perceptions of the international community and global media during disaster relief efforts; however, in this world, it is something that must be considered in every step.
Just as in war, the strategic and operational objectives of humanitarian assistance operations must support the political objective. Humanitarian assistance requires the close coordination of various organizations, but it is the cooperation between the State Department, USAID, and the Department of Defense that will ultimately determine its success in major disaster relief efforts. A whole-of-government response can still be achieved with an effective distribution of responsibilities, but it cannot compromise the unity of effort which is best supported by a strong, and clearly understood, unity of command. Security requirements must also be anticipated and thoughtfully executed through close coordination with the host nation and other pertinent authorities. Lastly, a strategic communications plan that leans forward in promoting the positive impact of the U.S. Government is essential to maintaining focus where it should be. With proper planning, expectation management, and effective communications the question of government intentions should never be a factor.
